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Discussion After the Speeches of Joseph Kattan and Calvin
Goldman
QUESTION, Mr. Yosowitz: Thank you very much, Cal. I would
like to pose one question to both of you.
You both touched on a subject: the Pilkington glass case, a British
company, I think, in a nonmerger intellectual property case. Cal men-
tioned the international guidelines, the new guidelines, and I also have
heard Anne Bingaman around various parts of the country talking
about how she is raring to go after those people and some people in
some other countries. Would you care to comment on that case or that
concept?
ANSWER, Mr. Kattan: I would love to comment on the Pilk-
ington case by way of exposure, having spent a good deal of the last
two years representing Pilkington.
The Pilkington case is, in my view, a disturbing extension of U.S.
antitrust to conduct which took place outside the United States. It es-
sentially attempted to impose U.S. standards upon the conduct of for-
eign companies. The case involved the British company that thirty-five
years ago came up with a radically new way of making glass. It chose
to protect its glass technologists with trade secrets, as well as through
patents, so that even today those trade secrets retain much of their
value.
An American company, PPG Industries, had licensed that technol-
ogy from Pilkington and was, by the terms of its license, permitted to
use that technology in the United States. Well, PPG wanted to use that
technology outside the United States and wanted to engage in subli-
censing, which its license did not permit it to do. Irregardless, it went
out and it did just that. Pilkington sued and enforced its trade secret
license in U.K. arbitration. The U.K. arbitrators found that PPG had
infringed Pilkington's intellectual property and awarded damages to
Pilkington.
PPG then sought the help of the U.S. government. The U.S. gov-
ernment, in the form of the antitrust department, decided that the re-
sults of the U.K. arbitration, which held that the intellectual property
remained valid, was something it could disregard. The United States
concluded that the intellectual property had lost much of its remaining
value today, and it did not justify the restrictions on competition which
were embodied in the license. I think the simple answer to that is, to
the extent that intellectual property does not have a great deal of value,
it would be very easy for a competitor to circumvent and do without to
the extent that they feel they have to use that intellectual property in
order to compete abroad.
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That tells you that intellectual property has value. Essentially the
U.S. government put itself in the position of a judge deciding that the
intellectual property was simply not sufficiently valuable. And in order
to promote the export of U.S. technology, they chose to override the
terms of the license agreement that had been freely negotiated between
two very large companies and had been sustained in an arbitration
outside the United States.
COMMENT, Mr. Klitgaard: I think that is one of the most short-
sighted views anyone could ever take, because U.S. companies are in a
position of licensing foreign companies, putting restrictions on where
they can re-license. And to apply that kind of a standard to Pilkington
or to anybody else as freely entered into is simply operating in the 18th
century.
And not to honor those intellectual property rights, from my per-
spective, after all these years in the field, really is kind of a mindless
application of the law.
If you remember what I put up on the board at the end of my
lecture, I do not think, therefore, I am not. That fit right into that
category. And I am not even representing Pilkington.
ANSWER, Mr. Goldman: I do not represent Pilkington, either,
but I agree with everything that has been said. I expressed some pretty
strong views from the perspective of a non-U.S. practitioner earlier this
month at the ABA meeting. But, those views were directed at the new
U.S. international guidelines that were also released that day, the day
before the intellectual property guidelines were released.
The guidelines for international antitrust released jointly by the
FTC and the DOJ go further than the 1988 guidelines in a number of
respects, and we believe that they reflect a reincarnation of a long-arm
approach in a strong-arm sense.
Having said that, there is another case that affected Canada di-
rectly. The FTC a few years ago decided to take jurisdiction, not only
take it, but exercise jurisdiction against Institut Marieus in its acquisi-
tion of certain facilities in Toronto, Canada. Also, it imposed an order
on what could be done with those facilities, how long they could be
leased and so on, even though the Canadian government was not going
to impose any order over those facilities. In the U.S. government's
view, the potential competition was in relation to the rabies vaccine and
the development of rabies. It is a gain in the same field that we are
talking about, but the FTC split three to two on that with a very strong
descent by commissioner Owen for her and another.
After having said that, the view right now is that the U.S. govern-
ment seems to be fired up to take even broader jurisdiction without
recognizing traditional principals of committee, because they can fall
back on the Hartford Insurance decision of the U.S. Supreme Court a
year or so ago. There is a concern out there, and what you have seen in
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Pilkington and Institut of Marieus just may happen again.
QUESTION, Mr. Faye: I just wondered, in reading the Financial
Press, I got the impression that Russia, when it went free had alumi-
num they could not use legally. All of you people got together and said,
we will give you higher prices, and all of a sudden aluminum compa-
nies are making great profits. I wonder if someone would tell us, was
that an antitrust problem?
ANSWER, Mr. Yosowitz: That is not an intellectual property is-
sue. But, I will discuss it since you brought it up. The memorandum of
understanding is among governments. The governments of the United
States, Canada, the United Kingdom, the European Common Market,
Australia, and Norway talked to the Russians. What was happening
was that the European Union had enacted a quota system against Rus-
sian metal. There were some competitors, not Alcan, but some other
U.S. competitors who were planning an antidumping suit. The U.S.
government heard about that and did not want to impede the new econ-
omy of Russia. So, they got together and talked to the Russians and
said, "you have environmental problems, and you have cash flow
problems. Your capital equipment is going bad. We will give you some
aid, if you will then act as a responsible citizen in a world economy."
Governments did this. It was not companies. There was a memo-
randum of understanding where no U.S. company or any other com-
pany in the world was obligated to do anything, nor were the Russians
obligated to do anything. But if they wanted aid from these govern-
ments, they had to cut some production. That is what you may have
heard about or read about. As I said, it is a memorandum of under-
standing between governments.
QUESTION, Professor King- I had a question for Joe Kattan.
We heard a few years ago about joint activities in the automotive
industry. What is the status of these activities? Are they working, or
what is going on?
ANSWER, Mr. Kattan: Well, I think the most celebrated case
was the NUMMI case, the GM Toyota joint venture, that took a lot of
doing to persuade the government even during the Reagan administra-
tion to let the transaction go through. There was a lot of lobbying
against the transaction by Chrysler, for example, which had argued the
transaction would reduce competition in the automotive field. The FTC
decided to permit the parties to go forward, the reason being that GM
would use the joint venture to learn more innovative Japanese auto
manufacturing techniques. But, this tied the company's hands in some
ways by imposing requirements on them to establish a brick wall type
of arrangement to prevent the flow competitively of sensitive
information.
A couple of years ago, GM and Toyota moved for that order to be
vacated, and they were successful. The way that the automobile market
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has evolved over the last ten years has shown that the competitive con-
cerns that had been raised at the time were not very serious concerns,
and that the automobile industry is very, very competitive. Whether the
joint venture was the mechanism through which GM learned to be
more efficient, I think that is open to debate.
COMMENT, Professor King: I just wanted to thank you very
much, Sandy Yosowitz, for chairing this session. It was a very good
session, and I want to thank our speakers, too, Joe Kattan and Cal
Goldman. We learned a lot.
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